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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 20050200-CA

REAGAN GRIFFITH,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); obstruction of
justice, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN . § 76-8-306( 1 )(b) (West 2004);
and driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6(2) (West 2004).
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did Trooper Watkins have probable cause to conduct a warrantless automobile
search where he observed defendant and her passenger furtively try to conceal items
he recognized from his training and experience as drug paraphernalia?

1

The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f
11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004
UT 95, T[ll, 103P.3d699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge.

Defendant

was charged by information

with possession

of

methamphetamine, a third degree felony; obstruction of justice, a third degree felony; and
driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor.
R117-118.
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence
discovered in a warrantless automobile search. See R146-142.
Conditional Guilty Plea. Defendant entered conditional guilty pleas as charged.
Rl 14-104; see also Rl 16.

2

Sentence. On 28 January 2005, the trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate
terms of from zero to five years for each of defendant's two felony convictions, and a thirtyday jail term for defendant's misdemeanor conviction. R126-125. The trial court then
suspended imposition of the felony terms and placed defendant on a thirty-six month term
of probation. R124.
Timely Notice of Appeal. On 25 February 2005, defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal. R132.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
A warrantless search of the passenger compartment of defendant's vehicle yielded
approximately forty grams of methamphetamine and related drug paraphernalia. R8-7.
Following a preliminary hearing held on 30 July 2004, and an evidentiary hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress held on 19 November 2004, the trial court found the
following facts:
1.

On the morning of May 2, 2004, Trooper Harley Watkins was
patrolling Highway 6 as part of his regular duties when he
observed a vehicle parked at a vacant store in the Soldier
Summit area of Wasatch County.2 Trooper Watkins stopped to
see if the occupants of the vehicle needed assistance, as the

^ h e facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's written ruling
denying defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah
App. 1997).
2

Judge Eyre also conducted the preliminary hearing, and reviewed the preliminary
hearing transcript prior to ruling in this case. Compare R134 and R152:3. Evidence
adduced at the preliminary hearing established that defendant's car was running when the
trooper approached. See R134:4, 12.
3

nearest town was around 20 miles away. Unbeknownst to
Trooper Watkins, Defendant was in the driver's seat of the
parked vehicle ingesting or preparing to ingest
methamphetamine.
2.

Trooper Watkins approached and parked behind and to the left
of Defendant's vehicle. His manner of parking did not restrain
or impede the ability of Defendant to move her vehicle had she
chosen to do so. Trooper Watkins did not turn on his red-andblue lights or any take-down lights. He simply parked his patrol
vehicle, exited it, and approached Defendant's vehicle.

3.

Upon arriving at Defendant's vehicle, Trooper Watkins tapped
on the driver's side window to get Defendant's attention. Both
Defendant and her passenger were leaning forward, hunched
over the center console. Trooper Watkins's tap startled
Defendant. When Defendant looked up, Trooper Watkins was
able to see that she possessed a rolled-up dollar bill, which she
then dropped. Trooper Watkins was also able to see that her
passenger was holding a napkin and a butane lighter, which he
was trying to conceal.

4.

Defendant and her passenger, upon observing Trooper Watkins,
became very nervous and appeared to be attempting to conceal
their activities.3

specifically, Trooper Watkins saw defendant "leanfing] into the center console.
And when [he] tapped on the door she came up startled[:] Her hands were opened and she
jumped and jerked and her eyes were huge, her eyes were as big as silver dollars. She
was obviously nervous []." Rl52:29. According to Trooper Watkins, defendant dropped
the rolled bill after realizing he was a police officer: "As she came up startled, saw that I
was a cop, and her hands opened at that time and that's when the bill dropped." Id. The
trooper further observed that defendant "was very very scared" and "based on [her] body
language[,] the totality of the circumstances[,] there was something inside the car she
didn't want [him] to see." Rl52:28.
Trooper Watkins also saw defendant's passenger "lean[ing] into the center
console." Rl52:29. Like defendant, the passenger also had something in his hand as he
came up "that he was trying to conceal and hide, kept trying to move it and that's what
drew [the trooper's] attention to the lighter, to the butane lighter." Id. The passenger's
4

5

Trooper Watkins asked Defendant where she was going, and she
responded that she was coming from the Las Vegas area on
Interstate 15 and was gong to Interstate 70. Trooper Watkins
observed that, in that event, sb? had missed ] T !KW< .IV by 200
miles.

(

Trooper Watkins has substantial training and experience in the
recognition of illegal drugs and their associated paraphernalia,
including service undercover on a narcotics interdiction task
force. Trooper Watkins testified that he had found rolled-up
bills and lighters similar to the one Defendant's passenger was
holding on many prior occasions in drug encounters. He further
testified that he had never observed anybody light tobacco with
such a lighter. This type of lighter, he testified, shoots a flame
much larger than a typical cigarette lighter, and is used, in his
experience, almost exclusively for the ingestion of drugs.

7.

The Court finds tnai i rooper Watkins's training and experience
are sufficient to inform him and the Court that he recognized the
rolled-up dollar bill and the butane torch as drug paraphernalia,
The trooper's conclusion was further supported by his
observation that Defendant and her passenger were easily
startled and became very nervous and apparently intent on
concealing their activities.

R146-143 (a copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact Conclusioi is of I aw, A oci <
Denying Motion to Suppress is attached in the addendum).
i^aseu on i:^._ ladings, the trial court concluded that "Trooper Watkins's initial
contact with Defendant was ,. [ : ,.T

\1* ••

:r..*

:

n.^u-h -w.:c:.: _ o

assist," and that "[u]pon viewing the drug paraphernalia and the behavior of Defendant and

"eyes were also as big as saucers. And he was, he was nervous, he was tense, his body
language, he was very tense and up-tight. He appeared to be very very worried about
having [the trooper] there,"TC152:3?
5

her passenger/' the trooper had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of their
vehicle. R143.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Trooper Watkins had probable cause to conduct the warrantless automobile search
here at issue. He observed from a lawful vantage point items he immediately recognized
from his training and experience as drug paraphernalia, a tightly rolled bill, napkin, and a
large butane lighter. Although defendant and her passenger could have possessed these items
for an innocent purpose, their nervous reactions to the trooper's appearance, and their furtive
attempts to conceal the items, reasonably suggested to the trooper that defendant and her
passenger had been using these items to ingest controlled substances. Given the totality of
the circumstances confronting the trooper, including the additional facts that defendant's car
was stopped in front of a vacant building twenty miles from the nearest town, and that she
was 200 miles off course from her stated destination, the trial court properly determined that
Trooper Watkins had probable cause to believe defendant and her passenger were engaged
in criminal activity, and that the warrantless search of their vehicle for the suspected
contraband was therefore justified. The trial court's sound ruling should be affirmed.

6

ARGUMENT
WATKINS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT A
WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCH WHERE HE OBSERVED
DEFENDANT AND HER PASSENGER FURTIVELY TRY TO
CONCEAL ITEMS HE RECOGNIZED FROM HIS TRAINING AND
EXPERIENCE AS DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
T R O O p E R

Although the a uii toun u,J ,iot specifically identify which exception to the warrant
. . ."lit* *

\ )\c\ ' • . - . . »

. ,irraiuic-^ ^ j.i

defendant's vehicle-here, the search was justified under the automobile exception.4 See
R146-143. add. \ Indeed, under the automobile exception, "[i]f a car is readily mobile and
PK

^ •• ,v, .^. ,

.1", in IIL'IICNC il c ' t. .:,. .•.-;;.; J.IMIK:. ihw rourtn Amendment. . .permits

police to search the vehicle without more," Maryland v. /Vsnn S'17 11 S IAS U^H' 1 0 0 )
(quotingPennsylvania w Tehran. 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (emphasis added)).
Defendant argued below that her initial encounter with the trooper amounted to an
nniu>r;^\'! >ri--I;-' • *

ippoa1. «lofV-^l;pn .1,^-. • .•

]

\d\> -LX ib*

.

• .-IPJ.. .• •.

Trooper Watkins's "initial approach to the defendant's car [was] a level one [voluntary]
encounter." Aplt. Rr, at 12.5 Rather, defendant's only challenge is to the trial court's ruling
4

Although defendant cites to both the federal and state constitutions in his brief; he
engages in no analysis of the state constitution. See Aplt. Br. at 10. His reliance on the
state constitution is therefore nominal and should not be addressed. See State v. Lafferty,
749 P.2d 1239, 1247, n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in state
constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state and
federal constitutions is briefed.").
defendant's brief lacks page numbers, but the table of contents does list numbers
for various pages in the brief; therefore, the State relies on the table of contents to
approximate the appropriate page in referencing defendant's brief.
7

that the warrantless search was justified by probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 14-19. Accordingly,
there is no dispute that defendant's vehicle was readily mobile for purposes of the automobile
exception, see Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467.
The sole issue on appeal is therefore whether the trial court properly found that
defendant's, and her passenger's, nervous and furtive conduct in attempting to conceal items
the trooper recognized—in his training and experience—as drug paraphernalia, amounted
to probable cause. For the reasons explained below, Trooper Watkins articulated probable
cause to conduct the warrantless vehicle search and the trial court's ruling should thus be
upheld.
Probable cause standard, "The determination of whether probable cause exists" for
a warrantless search of an automobile, as here, "depends upon an examination of all the
information available to the searching officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at
the time the search was made." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (citing
Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176(1949)). See also Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132,149 (1925) (probable cause is "abelief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law
is subject to seizure and destruction"). It is "a flexible, common-sense standard[,]" and
"merely requires that the facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief,' . . . that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful
as evidence of a crime[.]" Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (quoting Carroll, 267

8

U.S. at 162). "[I]t does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely
.•:

, .

*J::_:

-ruuijai. nontechnical' probability that incriminating

evidence is involved is all that is required."* / 7 Muotin - Rirt*«nir " ^ *' ^
words, "[t]he process" of calculating probable cause "does not deal with hard certainties, but
with probabilities. ,«. v quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981). Just as
w

f

" p r . h . " i c c i ! < • . ,'!*

• - . < • • • ,

M, '• , j w i i > , n

J'ILIMO:

may "law enforcement officers." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,
evidence pointing to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search "must be seen and
weigb^h

,.-i >.s*u

\\\K.W: .VIJA^

-:>^\

.^:A.U;IS.

field of law enforcement. "Id. (internal qu ' r-

;ua as understood in those versed in the

• *I s.» ' . iimi

Accordingly, the probable cause standard also recognizes that "[pjolice officers by
virtue .>; ,,^r; experience and training can sometimes recognize illegal activity where
r-i*

< -'/.MIS'

orefW \ [ - vniL'

ILXOUIIIL^

.:

should appropriately be given to that experience and training where there are objective facts
to justify the ultimate conclusion." Id. (citations omitted). See United States v. Arvizu, 534
* . *•

. *i"Lct»L;ii]/i:iLL ;.;^ cr.!oicemciu oiucers are allowed **> draw on their

own experience and specialized training to make inleivrkv

Voiv

:

\- :

!

-

cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person" (internal
V.i*••;.!•,. -a u.arivs ai.u ciuuion omitted)). &i\

ULSO

111 P . 3 d 8 0 8 (rec< - n i x i n g \ :d-'*i \ •- ^ p ^ l x i h k

9

State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \ 1 °

O^IM1'!,^-'

nation

• -lU!v:-. :-••..:

L>|CCLI\C

standpoint of reasonable officer including his experience and training) (citation and
quotation omitted).
Additionally, "[observation of what reasonably appear to be furtive gestures is a
factor which may properly be taken into account in determining whether probable cause
exists." 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.6(d), at 3 51 (4th ed. 2004) (citing [Sibron]
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,66-67 (1968)). However, "[f]urtive movements or gestures alone
are insufficient to constitute probable cause for search or arrest." State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d
506, 511 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis added). Thus, where an officer sees individuals in
possession of items that in his training and experience constitute drug paraphernalia, and the
individuals "make an apparent attempt to conceal [those items] from police view, probable
cause is present." LaFave, supra, § 3.6(d), at 352. See also id. § 3.6(b), at 318 n. 65, §
3.6(d), at 351 n.162 & 352 n.164 (all collecting cases holding that probable cause is
established where police see a person in possession of a suspicious object, and person
thereafter tries to hide the item).
This case. Applying the probable cause standard here, and considering the totality
of the circumstances confronting the trooper, the trial court's ruling upholding the trooper's
warrantless search of defendant's vehicle passes constitutional muster. As found by the trial
court, defendant and her passenger had stopped in front of a vacant building twenty miles
from the nearest town, and were approximately 200 miles off course from their stated
destination. R144. See United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1129 (10th Cir. 2005)

10

(recognizing that "implausible travel plans" can provide a basis for further investigation).
As the trooper approached, they were also hunched over the center console of the
\ <-hi. :

.-• . • \ .i •:• 'iv.x . •-•- w.itki;.^ ^jm, j \\ /.{• ai:oni

<•-; .ap; iiic c:. j:w u::\ or >
. :>,de

window, both defendant and her passenger exhibited extreme nervousness andforth-Hv ? *' • * *
to conceal from the trooper's view items he recognized as drug paraphernalia. Id.
Spcat^uhv. iMn'

MM.^LI

i^

seeing the trooper, defendant immediately let go of a rolled
-^p ;

bill, and her passenger tried to hide

•

f

*.

- v !* l-u

Watkins's training and experience these items are commonly associated with illicit drug use.
vithough the large butane lighter could also be used to light a tobacco cigarette or

the l\\ o to three inch lighter). Rather, a lighter that size could shoot a six inch fining ;mi' * • -"more common in drug usage." Rl 52:30; ^ee a/so Rl 52:31, R144. Trooper Watkins could
* :':..•

-.ii^ . . :, L.. i. L s ii L nuu i. iunii controlled substances together with

similar lighters; however, in just one werki -in

^'^\LI

- 'iere<^

\

Moab, Utah, he estimated he found approximately sixteen similar lighters together with
c< ... ..JU . uDstances. RI:>J:.> \:sce also u *- i i !e also had experience finding similar and
smaller lighters topothiM-\\ i:V .1: !^-'

:

-u^unv—- i". (*l:r- • ag. Uuii. .mi-, ^ 1 ,:KC{VV\CL1:

"On many occasions, numerous occasions I've seen similar lighters, not the exact shape or
sizc[. ] but similar lighters, similar situations, always with a controlled substance." Id. Given
MiNevjXM-i.':>.*.' 'J

. ;*p-:-'. ••^-i;: - r,pcL. o.: . .. . :iese i icms were being used to ingest

11

illicit substances. R144; see also R152:32. SeeArvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; Dorsey, 731 P.2d
at 1088 Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \ 17.
While an individual in possession of a rolled bill, napkin, and large butane lighter may
well have an innocent purpose, given the totality of the circumstances here, the trial court
properly found that Trooper Watkins had probable cause to believe that these items were
being put to an illicit purpose. See State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991)
(paper bindle clearly incriminating in light of officer's training and experience that "such
small, tightly shut paper packets are commonly used as containers for cocaine"). See also
State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123, 1131 (Fla. 1995) (reliable informant's tip established
probable cause for warrantless search where informant described Butler, his location, type
of drugs Butler was selling, and the method delivery: rolled bills).
To the extent there was doubt whether defendant and her passenger possessed these
items for an illicit—as opposed to an innocent—purpose, their nervous reactions to Trooper
Watkins appearance, including their attempts to conceal the items, compel the conclusion that
they were using the items to ingest an illicit drug. See, e.g., Warlick v. Gross, 969 F.2d 303,
309-310 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing presence of hand-rolled cigarettes combined with
corroborating evidence like a defendant's attempts to conceal them can establish probable
cause); Lewis v. State, 518 So.2d 214, 218 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (passing cigarette "in
manner common to marijuana use" and then dropping and stepping on it as police
approached constituted probable cause), abrogation on other grounds recognized by

12

Edwards v. State, 668 So.2d 167 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); People v. Lilienthal, 587 P.2d 706,
1

1 • • \-) 8) (probable cause to examine folded piece of paper Lilienthal dropped and

and said that his suspicion that it contained narcotics was based on his experience in making
numerous arrests where cocaine or heroin was transported in paper bindles similar to the one
ui-i

'i.

^

• *i

..-

„J \._v.

i->.

.

. o i , vprobable

cause to seize small manilla envelope of the t> pe commonly i iseci In (in ig sales ^ vhere
defendants furtively tried to conceal it from police); State v. Maguire, 523 A.2d 120, 124
;> ) (probable cause where Maguire possessed a vial of the kind often used to carry
•.*• -r ' •'

rr

•

"*cr\ > \t'\\), Sinn c Ruffing, -+v-> i.__u

1351, 1352 (N.H. 1985) (probable cause, as Ruffing, aware police had seen the remains of
several hand-rolled cigarettes and rolling papers, knocked the cigarettes to the floor and tried
tv) y in : iii.

i•.

.i pv i. . —;i., • • ^ , i ;edWsmo^
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.jibw Anere police received

confidential tip Thompson was selling large amounts of heroin, police thereafter saw him
exchange money for a white object, and Thompson tossed a folded napkin into open window
of vehicle as police approached); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 534 N.E.2d 24, 25-26 (Mass.
Ct. App. 1989) (probable cause where Rivera was in a possession of a baggie like that
regularly used in illicit drug transactions and also reacted to police presence with "behavior
reasonably interpreted to be evasive or furtive"); People v. McRay, 416 N.E.2d 1015, 1020
(N.Y. 1980) (recognizing that the exchange of a glassine envelope, together with "evidence
of furtive or evasive behavior on the part of the participants suffices to establish probable
cause"). Cf State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, ^ 11, 2005 WL 2877897 (holding that
officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Singleton, recognizing that Singleton's "walking
away" from officer

"can be considered an act of evasion, which leads to reasonable

suspicion, especially in light of the surrounding circumstances that included a hand-to-hand
exchange in an area known for drug trafficking").
Defendant's authorities are not to the contrary. Indeed, two of defendant's cited cases
are distinguishable because they involve scope of detention issues rather than probable cause
to conduct a warrantless search. See State v. Naranjo, 2005 UT App 311, 118 P.3d 285
(officer exceeded bounds of weapons frisk), and State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 107 P.3d
706 (officer unlawfully extended traffic stop to run warrant's check on passenger's license).
Although State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, 89 P.3d 185, similarly turns on whether police
articulated probable cause, Hechtle is not dispositive because it involves neither observable
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drug paraphernalia, nor any attempts to conceal paraphernalia. Id. at ^ 14. Rather, after
stopping Hechtle for a traffic violation, the trooper in that case detained Hechtle and his
passenger to investigate his suspicion that Hechtle was driving with any measurable
controlled substance in his body. Id. at \ 5. Based on his observations, among others, that
Hechtle and his passenger immediately lit cigarettes, that the passenger compartment
contained several air fresheners, that Hechtle's eyes were red, droopy, and watery, and his
pupils dilated, and that Hechtle's tongue was green and blistered, the trooper asked Hechtle
to step out of the car to conduct field sobriety tests. Id. at ^ 2-5. However, rather than
conduct the tests, the trooper frisked Hechtle for weapons and discovered a marijuana pipe.
Id. at Tf 5. A search of the car, incident to Hechtle's arrest, revealed marijuana. Id.
On appeal, this Court acknowledged that the cigarettes and air fresheners reasonably
suggested Hechtle was attempting to mask a controlled substance, and that the condition of
his eyes supported the trooper's suspicion that Hechtle was "engaged in criminal activity,"
but the Court refused to consider the green tongue evidence because it was unsupported by
citation to scientific studies, case law, or other authority to support the reliability of the
trooper's suspicion. Id. at Tf 13. Moreover, assuming the trooper's suspicions were
reasonable, he failed to confirm them with field sobriety tests, or by involving a certified
drug recognition expert. Id. at \ 14. Ruling the green tongue evidence unreliable, the Court
declined to hold that there was probable cause to believe Hechtle was driving with any
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measurable controlled substance in his body, emphasizing that the trooper had "noted no
visible drug paraphernalia," or other signs of recent drug use. Id.
Here, in contrast to Hechtle, Trooper Watkins saw "visible drug paraphernalia," a sign
of recent drug use. Id.

Moreover, the trooper also saw defendant and her passenger

furtively try to conceal the items from his view. Given the wealth of authority that police
observations of paraphernalia together with furtive behavior on the part of those possessing
the paraphernalia constitutes probable cause, the trial court properly ruled that Trooper
Watkins had probable cause to believe defendant and her passenger were engaged in criminal
activity and that the warrantless automobile search was therefore justified.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's felony convictions for possession and for obstruction ofjustice, and her
misdemeanor conviction for driving with any measurable controlled substance, should be
affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18,
*f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982).
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In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument."
Utah R. App. P. 29(a).
RESPECTFULLY submitted on^ftNovember 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

LRIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on J 2 6 November 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the BRIEF
OF APPELLEE, to the following:
SHELDEN R. CARTER
HARRIS & CARTER
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
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Wasatch County AUotncy
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TH THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
•IM i i i l i i

i

•••

•

•

mm0mtm^t

,

n

,

M

M||i

f'^

« » ^ ^ — 1

STATE OF UTAH,

i

l

i i

1 ..••iitllilMM

1

-

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER. DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

vs.
REAGAN GRIFFITH

!

Case No.
Judge Donald i. Eyre

Defendant.
THE ABOVB-ENTITLED MATTER came before the Court for Suppression Hearing on
November 19,2004. Plaintiff was ieprcaented by council, Thomas Low Defendant was present
and represented by Shetdcn Carter. The Court had previously received evidence at a Preliminary
Hearing. The Court having received additional evidence, argument, and briefing in connection
with the Suppiession Hearing hold Novcmbei ] 9,2004, and being fully advised wi the premises,
now hereby makes <md enters the following Findings of Fact;
FIN DINGS OF FACT
1.

On the morning of May 2,2004, Trooper Harley Watkins was patrolling .Highway
Page 1 of 5
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FAX NO. 4356545281

6 as pan of his regular duties when he observed a vehicle parked at a vacant store
in xhe Soldier Summit area of Wasatch County, Troopct Watkins stopped to see if
the occupants of the vehicle needod assistance, as the nearest town was around 20
miles away. Unbeknownst to Trooper Watkins, Defendant was in the driver's seat
of the parked vehicle ingesting or preparing to ingest meihamphetamine.
2.

Trooper Watkins approached and parked behind and to the left of Defendant's
vehicle. His manner of parking did not restrain or impede the ability of Defendant
to move her vehicle had she chosen to do so, Trooper Watkins did not turn on his
red-and-bluc lights or any take-down lights. He simply parked his patrol vehicle,
exited it, and approached Defendant's vehicle

3.

Upon arriving at Defendant's vcloicle, Trooper Watkins tapped on the driver's side
window to get Defendant's attention, Both Defendant and her passenger were
leaning forward, hunched over the center console Trooper Watkins's tap startled
Defendant. When Defendant looked up, Trooper Watkins was able to see that she
possessed a rolled-up dollar hill, which she then dropped Trooper Watkins was
also able to see that her passenger was holding a napkin and a butane lighter,
which he was trying to conceal,

4.

Defendant and her passenger, upon obsetving Trooper Watkins, became very
nervous and appeared to be attempting to co&ccal their activities,
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Trooper W^tkins asked Defendant where she was going, and she responded thai
she was comingfromthe Las Vegas area cm Interstate 15 and was going to
Interstate 70. Trooper Watkins observed that, in that event, sha had missed her
freeway by 200 miles,

6.

Trooper Watkins has substantial training and experience in the recognition of
illegal drugs and their associated paraphernalia, including service undercover on a
narcotics interdiction task forte, Trooper Watkins testified that he had found
rolled-Lip bills and lighters similar to the one Defendant's passenger was holding
on many prior occasions in drug encounters. He further testified that he had never
observed anybody light tobacco with such a lighter. This type of lighter, he
testified, shoots a flame much larger than a typical cigarette lighter, and is used, in
hi$ experience, almost exclusively for the ingestion of drugs,

7,

The Connfindsthat Trooper Watkins's training and experience are sufficient to
inform him and the Court that he recognized the rolled-up dollar bill and the
butane torch as drug paraphernalia. The trooper's conclusion was further
supported by his observation thai Defendant and her passenger were easily startled
and became very nervous and apparently intent on concealing their activities.

Page 3 of 5

w

*)

HAR-14-2005 HON 04=48 PH FOURTH DIST COURT HEBER

FAX NO. 4356545281

r\

BASED ON THE foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I-

Trooper Watkim initial contact with Defendant was a Level One encounter.
wherein he was merely offering to assist.

2.

Upon viewing the drug paraphernalia and the behavior cf Defendant and her
pwwugor, Trooper Walking had probable cause to search vehicle.

BASED ON THE foregoing M n g

S

of fact and con^sions of ] a w . tbeCou* now makes and

enters the following
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's n o f y p to mvppu u denied.

DATED this
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APPROVAL AS TO 'FORM;

SHELDEN CARTER,
Attorney for Defendant
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RULE 4-504 NOTICE
Defendant and his counsel arc hereby notified that iht above Order wil] be submitted to
the Court for signature S days from the date that it was mailed to you, unless you notify counsel
for the Plaintiff thai you object to its form or contsni.

THOMAS L. LOW, AttorneTfbrPb^irf

MAILING CERTIFICATE
! t a * y certify,ha,, raai W ,
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day of February, 2005, to;
Sbelden Carter
Harris & Carter
3325 North University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
FAX No. (801) 377-1149

u
Legal "

• • "•

0

Page s of 5

•*-*-*—-

u

^ ^

